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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
XU Duoxin
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DOI:10.17265/2328-2134/2025.04.005
Wuhan Britain-China School, Wuhan, China
Lying in politics has long been seen as both routine and destructive. While some falsehoods appear trivial, others undermine democratic processes, erode trust, and inflict significant harm on society. This essay investigates the moral, legal, and political dimensions of punishing political lies, drawing on Kantian deontological ethics, consequentialist reasoning, and theories of democratic communication. It distinguishes minor misstatements from harmful falsehoods that distort elections, public health responses, and national security. Building on Hannah Arendt’s warning about the collapse of truth and Jürgen Habermas’s emphasis on communicative integrity, the analysis shows how unchecked deception corrodes the foundations of democratic legitimacy. Although legal punishment risks overreach and potential misuse, political and social sanctions remain essential tools of accountability. By examining cases such as misinformation in the Iraq War and the COVID-19 pandemic, the essay argues that meaningful consequences for harmful lies are indispensable to maintaining truth as a shared democratic norm.
political lies, democratic accountability, trust, free speech, moral philosophy, legal sanctions, public communication
XU Duoxin. (2025). Accountability for Political Deception in Democratic Societies: Political Lies and Their Consequences for Democratic Trust. International Relations and Diplomacy, July-Aug. 2025, Vol. 13, No. 4, 209-212.
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