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How Does Private Language Bear on the Cartesian Theory of Mind?
ZHANG Yi, ZHANG Zibo
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DOI:10.17265/2328-2177/2026.01.008
Shandong University, Jinan, China; Shandong University, Qingdao, China
The Cartesian meditations on first philosophy intended to demonstrate the existence of God. Wittgenstein’s private language argument is regarded as an attack on Cartesian dualism through the investigation of “private language” by a paradigm of sensation. This article explores how the “private language argument” bears on the Cartesian theory of mind. The mind and the body are not distinct and independent. Instead, the mind should be elucidated as the root of the body.
Wittgenstein, the nature of sensation, nothingness
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